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Abstract
In the neoclassical model of consumer behavior, considerable work has
been done investigating when a consumers demand can be described as hav-
ing been derived from utility maximization. We extend prior analyses to an
uncertainty setting by providing conditions under which contingent claim
and asset demands will be consistent with state independent Expected Util-
ity maximization. One unique feature of our analysis is to allow demands
to be functions of probabilities and not just prices and income. First, we
provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a nite set of observations
on prices, probabilities and quantities to be consistent with Expected Util-
ity maximization for the case of a single commodity in each state. This
condition can be interpreted as being analogous to the strong axiom of re-
vealed preference in classical certainty demand theory. Second, we provide
a characterization of the functional form for demand to be rationalized by an
Expected Utility function. Third, we give conditions on the Slutsky matrix
that are necessary and su¢ cient for rationalization by Expected Utility.
KEYWORDS. Expected Utility, additive separability, state independence.
JEL CLASSIFICATION. D01, D11, D80.
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1
1 Introduction
The neoclassical certainty model of consumer behavior postulates that a con-
sumers demand can be described as having been derived from utility maximiza-
tion subject to a budget constraint. One is then naturally led to ask what this
model implies about observed demand behavior. This question has been ad-
dressed using two quite distinct approaches. The rst, originating in the work of
Slutsky (1915) and Antonelli (1886), derives necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for utility maximization assuming knowledge of the consumers demand functions.
The second approach known as "revealed preference", following the classic work
of Samuelson (1938), provides necessary and su¢ cient restrictions on a nite set
of demand-price pairs such that the demand behavior of a consumer is consistent
with utility maximization.
In this paper, we extend both approaches to a classic portfolio choice problem,
where consumers possess state independent Expected Utility preferences and there
is a single commodity in each state. We focus only on the complete market case,
where the nancial asset setting is equivalent to the contingent claim setting and
hence it is only necessary to discuss demand tests for the latter. We depart from
the standard contingent claim theory by assuming that state of nature probabilities
are not xed and we model demand as a function of probabilities as well as prices
and income.
For the revealed preference approach, with the restriction of a single commodity
in each state, we derive a much simpler test for Expected Utility maximization than
those that currently exist in the literature. For example the formulation of Green
and Srivastava (1986), as in the revealed preference models of Afriat (1967) and
Varian (1983), postulates the existence of unknown utility levels and multipliers.
We do not require these existential quantiers and our condition is analogous to the
strong axiom of revealed preference in classical demand theory. The conditions
involve probabilities but remain necessary and su¢ cient when probabilities are
xed (and known). From our revealed preference test, it is possible to tell whether
the Expected Utility hypothesis is consistent with the assumed nite data set. If
consistency is not refuted and one wants to use the data to estimate a demand
function, one requires restrictions on the functional form to be employed which
ensure that the estimated function is rationalized by an Expected Utility function.
We derive simple restrictions on contingent claim demand functions which are
necessary and su¢ cient for preferences to be representable by a state independent
Expected Utility function. Going back to at least Samuelson (1947), there is a
substantial literature on the certainty version of this problem but there are few
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results in the literature that are concerned with contingent claim demand and
Expected Utility maximization. Our approach di¤ers from that of Dybvig (1983)
in two ways. First, we do not need to assume that the representation is additively
separable. Second, we require knowledge of how demand varies with exogenously
varying probabilities. Dybvigs test can be conducted on the functional form
of demands with or without knowing the explicit values of probabilities. How-
ever because for him probabilities are xed, his test fails to distinguish between
demands coming from Expected Utility functions and representations which one
would not typically refer to as Expected Utility.1
Given the seminal role played by restrictions on the Slutsky matrix in ensur-
ing the existence of a well behaved utility function that rationalizes demand, we
investigate what additional Slutsky restrictions correspond to utility taking the
Expected Utility form. Goldman and Uzawa (1964) give necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for additively separable utility based on terms in the Slutsky matrix.
We simplify their conditions for our case of one good per state and derive two ad-
ditional conditions, one of which is a new derivative condition involving terms in
the Slutsky matrix. Together these three conditions are necessary and su¢ cient
for demand to be rationalized by Expected Utility.
Clearly our assumption that state of nature probabilities vary confronts obvi-
ous obstacles in practical implementation. However, the implicit assumption in
the standard approach that repeated observations on demands can be obtained
while holding probabilities xed seems less than fully compelling. One would ex-
pect that observations on an individuals choices in nancial markets where prices
change could correspond to the case where probability distributions of asset payo¤s
also change. To explore these issues, recent new approaches to laboratory exper-
iments may o¤er some promise for extending classical tests of consumer behavior
to models with uncertainty (see, for example, Choi, et al. 2007 and Andreoni and
Sprenger 2012).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
notation and the basic contingent claim/asset optimization problem. In Section
3, we derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an observed nite set of demand,
price and probability triplets to be consistent with Expected Utility maximization.
Section 4 provides restrictions on demands such that they are rationalizable by
Expected Utility functions.
1See Example 1 and Remark 3 below.
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2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we consider a classic complete market portfolio choice
setting with S states of nature, a single commodity per state and J = S nancial
assets. Denote the payo¤ for asset j (j 2 f1; 2; :::; Jg) in state s (s 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg)
by js and the matrix of payo¤s by . The quantities of assets are denoted by
zj and their prices are denoted by Pj. An individual has preferences over state
contingent consumption, x 2 RS++, that depend on the probabilities 1; : : : ; S
and is represented by a utility function U(x;) which is assumed to be strictly
quasiconcave, strictly increasing in x and three times continuously di¤erentiable
in x and . It should be noted that  enters into U as a parameter that is allowed
to vary exogenously, but  is not a choice variable. The consumers preferences
are dened over contingent claims. The utility U(x;) is said to take the state
independent Expected Utility form when
U(x;) =
SX
s=1
su (xs) ; (1)
where u denotes the NM (von Neumann-Morgenstern) index and satises u 2 C3;
u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.
Given income I and facing prices P and probabilities , the agent solves
max
x2Rs++;z2RJ
U(x;) S:T: P  z  I
xs =
SX
j=1
zjsjs for all s = 1; : : : ; S: (2)
We investigate what restrictions the assumption of state independent Expected
Utility imposes on the solution of this maximization problem as a function of
prices, incomes and probabilities. We consider two settings. First we assume
that we have N observations on asset demands, prices, as well as probabilities
(zi;Pi;i)Ni=1. Second, we assume that we observe the demand function z(P;; I)
for an open set of prices, incomes and probabilities. Probabilities are assumed to
be known. In our demand function tests we investigate when U takes the Expected
Utility form (1) for all specications of . Some of our tests will be seen to depend
critically on how the probability parameter  enters into the consumers demand
function.
Our assumption that markets are complete ensures that the S assets pay-
o¤s are linearly independent. This allows us to transform our observations into
(x;p;), where x =z and PT = pT. Therefore, we focus on the contingent
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claim demand x(p;; I) that solves
max
x2Rs++
U(x;) S:T: p  x  I; (3)
where p = (p1; :::; pS) is the contingent claim price vector. Note that if contingent
claim demand is derived from the Expected Utility function (1), demand is ho-
mogeneous of degree zero in . It is not necessary to normalize probabilities and
since we consider derivatives with respect to probabilities, it will prove convenient
not to do so. We therefore assume  2 RS++.
We next consider an example which highlights our key assumption that demand
is a continuous, di¤erentiable function of probabilities as well as prices and income.
This di¤erentiates our approach from most contingent claim formulations which
assume demand is a function of prices and income, but probabilities are xed
parameters.
Example 1 Assume there are three states of nature and preferences are repre-
sented by the following utility
U (x1; x2; x3; 1; 2; 3) =  
3X
s=1
s (exp ( 1xs) + exp ( 2xs) + exp ( 3xs)) :
(4)
Clearly this representation is not an Expected Utility function since probabilities
do not enter into the function linearly. Moreover each subutility u(xs), although
being state independent, is probability dependent which of course is inconsistent
with the classic NM index in eqn. (1). Suppose instead of assuming that  is an
exogenous variable, probabilities take on xed values as in the standard contingent
claim setting (e.g., Dybvig 1983). Then if
1 = 0:6; 2 = 0:3 and 3 = 0:1; (5)
the utility (4) can be expressed as
U (x1; x2; x3; 1; 2; 3) =  
3X
s=1
s (exp ( 0:6xs) + exp ( 0:3xs) + exp ( 0:1xs)) :
(6)
This can be viewed as taking the state independent Expected Utility form of eqn.
(1) with the NM index given by
u (x) =   (exp ( 0:6x) + exp ( 0:3x) + exp ( 0:1x)) : (7)
If one alternatively assumes that probabilities are given by
1 = 0:50; 2 = 0:35 and 3 = 0:15; (8)
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once again the form of U can be viewed as taking the state independent Expected
Utility form. However now the NM index
u (x) =   (exp ( 0:50x) + exp ( 0:35x) + exp ( 0:15x)) (9)
di¤ers from (7) by more than a positive a¢ ne transform. Any demand test based
on the assumption of xed probabilities will not be able to distinguish between (4)
and (6).
3 A Revealed Preference Test
In this section, we provide conditions for a nite set of demand-price-probability
triplets which are necessary and su¢ cient for the demand behavior of a consumer
to be consistent with state independent Expected Utility maximization.
Green and Srivastava (1986) derive a complete market revealed preference test
of Expected Utility maximization in a setting where there are multiple goods in
each state. We consider the simpler case where there is a single good in each state.
This will enable us to eliminate the assumption of existential quantiers required
in Green and Srivastava (1986) and obtain a result that is essentially analogous
to the strong axiom of revealed preference.
We have N observations on contingent claim demands, prices and probabilities
(xi;pi;i)Ni=1 with x
i 2 RS++, pi 2 RS++ and i being a vector of positive probabil-
ities for each i = 1; :::; N . In line with the rest of the paper, we assume that the
probabilities are observable and can vary across observations.2 Without loss of
generality, we assume throughout this section that xis 6= xjs0 for all i; j and all s; s0
(the case where xis = x
j
s0 for some i; j and some s; s
0 can be easily considered sep-
arately). In order to eliminate the assumption of existential quantiers required
in Green and Srivastava (1986), it will prove convenient to dene is = p
i
s=
i
s for
all i = 1; :::; N , s = 1; :::; S, and the operator
L(i; j) = max
s;s0: xis>x
j
s0
is
js0
; (10)
where we set L(i; j) = 0 if xis < x
j
s0 for all s; s
0.
Denition 1 We say that (xi;pi;i)Ni=1 satisfy the strong axiom of revealed ex-
pected utility (SAREU) if for any m > 1 and all i1; :::; im 2 f1; :::; Ng we have
L(i1; i2)  L(i2; i3)  :::  L(im 1; im)  L(im; i1) < 1: (11)
2If probabilities are not observable our conditions in Theorem 1 below remain necessary and
su¢ cient if one treats probabilities as unknown positive numbers and condition (ii) is adjusted
to say that there exist real numbers is > 0 and 
i > 0.
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Remark 1 Note that the case where m = 2 and i1 = i2 = i implies that L(i; i) <
1, which is equivalent to
xis > x
i
s0 ) is < is0 (12)
for each i and all s; s0.
Comparing our analysis with the certainty formulation of Afriat (1967), it
can be observed that SAREU plays the role of Afriats cyclic consistency which
as Varian (1982) argues is a version of the general axiom of revealed preference
(GARP). As in Afriat, our condition (11) must hold for all cycles. However our
condition involves the product of the risk neutral prices (i.e., ps
s
) rather than a
sequence of price-quantity inequalities.
We have the following Theorem.
Theorem 1 The following three statements are equivalent.
(i) There exists a continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave NM index
u : R++ ! R such that for all i = 1; :::; N
xi 2 arg max
x2RS++
SX
s=1
isu(xs) S:T: p
i  x  pi  xi: (13)
(ii) There exist real numbers i > 0 for i = 1; :::; N such that for all i; j = 1; :::; N
and any s; s0 = 1; ::::; S,
xis > x
j
s0 ) iis < jjs0 : (14)
(iii) The observations (xi;pi;i)Ni=1 satisfy SAREU.
Proof. The equivalence between (i) and (ii) is standard, see e.g., Kubler and
Schmedders (2010), Lemma 2. To show the equivalence of (ii) and (iii), we rst
show that (ii) implies (iii). From (ii), for i = j, clearly we have
xis > x
i
s0 ) iis < iis0 ) is < is0 ; (15)
implying that SAREU holds for this case. For all i 6= j if xis > xjs0 , we must
have that 
j
i
> L(i; j). Since 
i2
i1
 i3
i2
:::  i1
im
= 1, we must have that eqn. (11) of
SAREU holds.
Finally we show that (iii) implies (ii). Given that SAREU holds, and given
N observations, there must be an  > 0 such that for any m > 1 all i1; :::; im 2
f1; :::; Ng we have
L(i1; i2)  L(i2; i3)  :::  L(im 1; im)  L(im; i1) < 1
(1 + )m
: (16)
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We can then construct (i)Ni=1 as follows. First without loss of generality we can
take x1 from the rst observation to contain the largest consumption value, i.e.,
there is an s so that x1s > x
i
s0 for all i; s
0. Then dene 1 = 1 and for j = 2; 3; :::; N ,
j = max
k
max
(1;i2;:::;ik 1;j)2Ik
L(1; i2)  :::  L(ik 1; j)(1 + )k; (17)
where Ik = f(i1; i2; :::; ik 1; ik) j im 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng for each m = 1; :::; kg. Note
that eqn. (16) and the assumption that x1s is the largest consumption value for
some s guarantee that each j is positive and well dened. In e¤ect the maximum
is only taken over vectors of at most length N , since eqn. (16) implies that
cycles where il = ik for some l; k can never be part of the maximizing sequence
of L(i; j). To prove that (iii) implies (ii), it su¢ ces to show that i > j 
j
s
i
s0
whenever xjs > x
i
s0 . Note that there must be some k and some i2; :::; ik 1 so that
j = L(1; i2)  : : :  L(ik 1; j)(1 + )k. But by the denition of L(j; i), we have
i > L (1; i2) :::L(ik 1; j)(1 + )k  L(j; i)  j 
j
s
is0
: (18)
This proves the Theorem.
Remark 2 Note that in Theorem 1 (i) we only require the NM index u to be
continuous and concave and do not require u 2 C3 as assumed in Section 2.
However it follows from Chiappori and Rochet (1987) that with a nite number
of observations, it is irrelevant whether one assumes di¤erentiability or not. In
particular, their Theorem (p. 688) implies that one can take u 2 C1 since for any
nite set of observations satisfying SAREU there exists an innitely di¤erentiable
utility function that rationalizes these observations.
Of course, Theorem 1 holds for xed probabilities and is then comparable to
Theorem 1 in Green and Srivastava (1986). It follows that although Green and
Srivastava only consider a xed probability setting, actually their analysis can
naturally be extended to the case when state probabilities are allowed to change.
Conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1 are then essentially the same as conditions
(i) and (ii) of Theorem 1 in Green and Srivastava (1986). They show that (i) is
equivalent to the existence of (uis)i=1:::N;s=1:::S and (
i)Ni=1 such that
ujs0   uis  iis(xjs0   xis) for all i; j; s; s0; (19)
with the strict inequality holding in our one commodity case, whenever xjs0 6= xis.
Adding up the inequalities for j; s0 and i; s and the one for i; s and j; s0, we obtain
0  iis(xjs0   xis) + jjs(xis   xjs0) (20)
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which is obviously equivalent to (ii) if we assume that xis 6= xjs0 . Since the xis are
scalars, the converse is also true. This is easily seen by observing that given xis; 
i
s
and i for all i; s, we can construct a piecewise linear and concave utility function
where iis is taken to be the slope at x
i
s.
Since we impose the more restrictive assumption that there is only one good
in each state, we are able to derive the new result Theorem 1(iii), which does
not require the existential quantiers (i)Ni=1. In this sense, Theorem 1(iii) is
analogous to Afriats cyclic consistency and is analogous to the strong axiom of
revealed preference.
Varian (1983) derives a revealed preference condition for asset demand in a
setting with possibly incomplete markets and a single commodity. For the case of
complete markets Theorem 1 in his paper becomes the same as eqn. (19) above.
As in Green and Srivastava (1986) all his conditions involve unknown multipliers
and utility levels.
It follows from Varian (1988) that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
an Expected Utility function to exist that rationalizes one demand observation
(x;p;) is that xs is a decreasing function of ps=s. This is equivalent to Theorem
1(ii) when i = j. The contribution of our result is to show the equivalence between
(ii) and our new condition SAREU (iii) for any nite number of observations.
Two interesting, recent papers focus on revealed preference tests for Expected
Utility preferences. Echenique and Saito (2013) develop a revealed preference
test for (Savage) subjective Expected Utility preferences and probabilities. They
show that our SAREU is similar to their revealed preference axiom if probabilities
become observable in their framework. Polisson and Quah (2013) provide a new
procedure for testing the consistency of observed contingent claim demands with
maximizing general uncertainty preferences without assuming concavity.
4 Demand Function Tests
Suppose the consistency test for Expected Utility preferences based on a nite
data set discussed in the prior section is not refuted and one wants to use the
data to estimate a demand function. Then it is necessary to derive restrictions
on the functional form to be employed in the test. In this section, we derive
two di¤erent sets of restrictions on the demand functions which are necessary and
su¢ cient for preferences to be representable by an Expected Utility function. The
Slutsky matrix for any given demands (asset or contingent claim) is assumed to
be symmetric and negative semidenite, implying that the demands can always be
rationalized by a utility function. The question is whether it takes the Expected
9
Utility form.
4.1 Functional Form Restrictions
The following characterizes restrictions on the form of the demand functions
x(p;; I) which are necessary and su¢ cient for the generating utility to be ordi-
nally equivalent to a state independent Expected Utility function.3
Theorem 2 Assume that S > 2 and contingent claim demands xs(p;; I) > 0
(s = 1; 2; :::; S) can be rationalized by a well dened utility function. Then this
utility function is ordinally equivalent to a state independent Expected Utility func-
tion as dened in eqn. (1) if and only if there is a twice continuously di¤erentiable
function f : R2++ ! R++ such that the contingent claim demands xs(p;; I)
(s = 1; 2; :::; S) satisfy xs = f (x1; ks), where ks is dened by
ks =def
sp1
1ps
; (21)
f (x1; ks) is strictly increasing in ks and f(x; 1) = x for all x.
To prove this result, we will utilize a modied version Samuelsons (1947) classic
necessary and su¢ cient condition for additive separable utility (in a certainty
setting).
Lemma 1 When S > 2, preferences are representable by a twice continuously
di¤erentiable additively separable utility
U(x) =
SX
s=1
us (xs) (22)
if and only if
@

@U=@xs
@U=@x1

@xi
= 0 (8i; s 2 f2; 3; :::; Sg ; i 6= s) : (23)
3Relative to the result in Theorem 2, it should be noted that Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
observe that in a two period discounted Expected Utility (DEU) model, intertemporal allocations
will depend only on the ratio of the intertemporal probabilities 1=2 and not on 1 or 2
separately, where 1 and 2 are the probabilities of the outcomes with nonzero utility value in
periods one and two, respectively. They point out that this is a critical and testable implication
of the DEU model. This conclusion uses a similar idea to eqn. (21) in Theorem 2, although
their setting is very di¤erent from ours.
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It should be emphasized that Samuelson (1947, p. 179) actually considers
conditions on the inverse demand function that ensure existence of a separable
utility and that he does not assume the existence of U in his discussion. In his
framework, the the marginal rate of substitution in (23) is replaced by the the
inverse demand function
@U=@xi
@U=@xj
=
pi
pj
(24)
and he requires that, in addition to (23) the following holds
@

@U=@xs
@U=@x2

@x1
= 0 (8s 2 f3; 4; :::; Sg) : (25)
If one does not start with inverse demand, but assumes that U exists, then
(23) implies (25). To see this, notice that 8s 2 f3; 4; :::; Sg,
@

@U=@x2
@U=@x1

@xs
= 0, @
2U
@x2@xs
@U
@x1
  @
2U
@x1@xs
@U
@x2
= 0 (26)
and
@

@U=@xs
@U=@x1

@x2
= 0, @
2U
@x2@xs
@U
@x1
  @
2U
@x1@x2
@U
@xs
= 0: (27)
Subtracting the above two equations yields (25)
@2U
@x1@xs
@U
@x2
  @
2U
@x1@x2
@U
@xs
= 0, @
@x1

@U=@xs
@U=@x2

= 0: (28)
Next we will give the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. Necessity follows directly from the rst order condition. Next we prove
su¢ ciency. We rst show that for S > 2, the condition xs = f (x1; ks) implies
that U is (ordinally) additively separable. Given the existence of U , the rst
order conditions for the maximization (3) are
@U=@x1
@U=@xs
=
p1
ps
(s = 2; 3; :::; S) : (29)
For each s 2 f2; :::; Sg, since xs = f (x1; ks) and f (x1; ks) is a strictly increasing
function of ks, we have
sp1
1ps
= ks = f
 1
x1
(xs) ; (30)
or equivalently
@U=@xs
@U=@x1
=
s
1f 1x1 (xs)
; (31)
implying that
@

@U=@xs
@U=@x1

@xi
= 0 (8i; s 2 f2; 3; :::; Sg ; i 6= s) : (32)
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When S > 2, (32) is obviously identical to eqn. (23) in Lemma 1. Thus it follows
from Lemma 1 that one can assume U takes the form
U(x;) =
SX
s=1
us (xs;) : (33)
Therefore the rst order condition can be written as
u01 (x1;)
u0s (xs;)
=
p1
ps
, su
0
1 (x1;)
1u0s (xs;)
= ks: (34)
Since xs = f (x1; ks), we have ks = f 1x1 (xs), implying that
su
0
1 (x1;)
1u0s (xs;)
= f 1x1 (xs) (35)
must be independent of . Denoting
hs (xs;) =
u0s (xs;)
s
; (36)
we have
@
@

h1 (x1;)
hs (xs;)

= 0; (37)
implying that
@ (lnh1 (x1;))
@
=
@ (lnhs (xs;))
@
: (38)
Taking the derivative with respect to xs on both sides of the above equation yields
@2 (lnhs (xs;))
@xs@
= 0; (39)
implying that
lnhs (xs;) = Gs (xs) +Hs () ; (40)
whereHs () is a function of probabilities and Gs (xs) is a function of xs. Dening
Ks () = exp (Hs ()) and vs (xs) = exp (Gs (xs)) ; (41)
we immediately obtain
hs (xs;) = Ks () vs (xs) ; (42)
where Ks () is a function of probabilities and vs (xs) is a function of xs. Due
to eqn. (37), Ks () must be the same for all s = 1; 2; :::; S, and can be denoted
K () : Therefore from (36), we have
u0s (xs;) = K () svs (xs) (s = 1; 2; 3; :::; S) : (43)
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Since when ks = 1, xs = f (x1; 1) = x1, we must have v1 = vs = v. Dening
u (xs) =
Z
v (xs) ds; (44)
it immediately follows that the given demands can be rationalized by a utility func-
tion that is ordinally equivalent to a state independent Expected Utility function
as dened in eqn. (1). Finally, since
f (x1; ks) = u
0 1

u0 (x1)
ks

(45)
is strictly increasing in ks, u is strictly concave.
The demand restriction xs = f (x1; ks) in Theorem 2 will be referred to as
the k-test. It should be stressed that f depends on prices and probabilities only
through ks.
It is natural to wonder why the S = 2 case is not included in Theorem 2.
Before addressing this question, we provide an example which illustrates that
when S = 2 the k-test by itself is not su¢ cient if U is not additively separable.
Example 2 Assume that
U (x;) =

1x1
1 + 22
+ x2

x
1
22
1 ; (46)
which can be veried to be strictly increasing in each of its argument and strictly
quasiconcave. Next we directly verify that the demand functions corresponding
to this utility pass our k-test. The rst order condition gives that
1 (x1 + x2)
22x1
=
p1
p2
; (47)
implying that
x2 = (2k2   1)x1; (48)
where
k2 =
2p1
1p2
: (49)
Denote
f (x1; k2) = (2k2   1)x1: (50)
It is clear that x2 = f (x1; k2) where f (x1; k2) is increasing in k2 and f (x; 1) = x.
Therefore the k-condition is satised. However, (46) is clearly not an Expected
Utility. Therefore for the S = 2 case, the Theorem 2 k-test is not su¢ cient and
is only valid as a necessary condition.
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To understand why the k-test fails for this example, consider the very di¤erent
treatment of the S = 2 and S > 2 cases in Samuelson (1947, pp. 176-183) when
discussing additive separability. When S = 2, U is (ordinally) additively separable
if and only if
@ ln

@U=@x1
@U=@x2

@x1@x2
= 0: (51)
When S > 2; the necessary and su¢ cient conditions become (23) and (25) in
Lemma 1. However when S = 2, there is no way to derive (51) from Theorem 2.
This can also be seen from the proof of Theorem 2. The rst part of the proof
shows that for S > 2, the condition xs = f (x1; ks) implies additive separability
(independent of whether probabilities vary or are xed). The second part of
the proof demonstrates that if this condition is satised for any S, the separable
utility must be a state independent Expected Utility. Therefore, when S = 2,
Theorem 2 can only work as a necessary and not su¢ cient condition. Of course
if one assumes that U is additively separable (ruling out Example 2), then the
conditions in Theorem 2 become necessary and su¢ cient for any S.
Remark 3 In contrast to our approach, Dybvig (1983, Theorem 10) assumes that
U is additively separable. He then shows that U is a (state independent) Expected
Utility function if and only if the following holds
@U=@x1
@U=@xs

x1=xs
=
1
s
: (52)
Therefore combining the results of Samuelson and Dybvig, one obtains another
demand test for Expected Utility. It should be noted that Dybvigs test also assumes
a standard contingent claim setting, where probabilities are xed and treated as
constants. This is a key di¤erence between Dybvigs test and the k-test in Theorem
2, where probabilities are parameter values which are allowed to vary exogenously.
It should be stressed that Theorem 2 requires probabilities and prices to enter into
the relationship between x1 and xs only through ks and this condition cannot be
veried if the probabilities are xed numbers. This important di¤erence between
our result and that of Dybvig can be illustrated using the exponential utility function
(4) in Example 1. For this utility, it follows from the rst order condition that
for s = 2; 3,
1 (exp ( 1x1) + exp ( 2x1) + exp ( 3x1))
s (exp ( 1xs) + exp ( 2xs) + exp ( 3xs)) =
p1
ps
; (53)
or equivalently
exp ( 1x1) + exp ( 2x1) + exp ( 3x1)
exp ( 1xs) + exp ( 2xs) + exp ( 3xs) = ks; (54)
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where
ks =
sp1
1ps
: (55)
Since the left hand side of eqn. (54) depends on probabilities, it is impossible to
have xs = f (x1; ks), where f is a function independent of prices and probabilities.
Therefore, the demands generated by this utility function cannot pass our test in
Theorem 2. However, the demands generated by (4) will always pass Dybvigs
test. To see this, rst note that the utility function (4) is additively separable.
Moreover, it follows from the rst order condition that
@U=@x1
@U=@xs
=
1 (exp ( 1x1) + exp ( 2x1) + exp ( 3x1))
s (exp ( 1xs) + exp ( 2xs) + exp ( 3xs)) : (56)
When evaluating the right hand side of the above equation at x1 = xs, one can
obtain
@U=@x1
@U=@xs

x1=xs
=
1
s
; (57)
which satises Dybvigs condition.
We next consider an example which illustrates for the S = 2 case the applica-
tion of Theorem 2 as a necessary condition.
Example 3 Consider the following pair of demand functions
x1 =
0B@ 1
p1 + p2

2p1
1p2
2 + 1(1 + 2) p1
1CA I
2
(58)
and
x2 =
0B@

2p1
1p2
2
p1 + p2

2p1
1p2
2 + 2(1 + 2) p2
1CA I
2
: (59)
Dening the component of the Slutsky matrix as ij (i; j = 1; 2) where
ij =
@xi
@pj
+ xj
@xi
@I
; (60)
it can be veried that
12 = 21; 11 < 0; 22 < 0 and 1122 = 1221; (61)
implying that the Slutsky matrix is symmetric and negative semidenite. There-
fore, the given demands can be rationalized by a utility function. Following the
Hurwicz-Uzawa integration process (Hurwicz and Uzawa 1971), we obtain
U (x1; x2; 1; 2) =
m
1
r
p
2+21
1+2
21+p
2
2
; (62)
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where the relative price p = p1=p2 is given by
p =
1 (2x2   1x1) +
p
21 (
2
1x
2
1 + 
2
2x
2
2 + 2x1x2 (4
2
1 + 4
2
2 + 912))
2x12 (1 + 22)
(63)
and the normalized income m = I=p2 is given by
m =
1 (2x2   1x1) +
p
21 (
2
1x
2
1 + 
2
2x
2
2 + 2x1x2 (4
2
1 + 4
2
2 + 912))
22 (1 + 22)
+ x2:
(64)
The above form of utility (62) is clearly not additively separable and does not take
the Expected Utility form. This is conrmed by the following application of the
k-test from Theorem 2. Noticing that
x2
x1
=
1
p1+p2

2p1
1p2
2 + 1(1+2)p1
2p1
1p2
2
p1+p2

2p1
1p2
2 + 2(1+2)p2
(65)
is not solely a function of k2 =
2p1
1p2
, it follows from Theorem 2 that the demand
functions (58)-(59) cannot be rationalized by an Expected Utility representation
for all values of x1 and x2.
4.2 Demand Derivative Restrictions
In the prior subsection, we provide a characterization that is necessary and suf-
cient for demands to be rationalizable by a state independent Expected Utility.
To ensure that the given functions are actually demand functions (i.e., can be ra-
tionalized by some utility function), we have assumed that the Slutsky symmetry
and negative semideniteness conditions are satised. But what additional con-
ditions does the assumption of Expected Utility impose on the Slutsky matrix?
Goldman and Uzawa (1964) provide a partial answer - they show that the as-
sumption of separable utility can be tested with a condition on the Slutsky terms.
We simplify their condition in our setting and provide additional conditions which
collectively are necessary and su¢ cient for Expected Utility maximization. Our
conditions involve the partial derivatives of the assumed demand with respect to
probabilities.
It will prove useful to derive the Slutsky equation using the implicit function
theorem (see, for example, Kreps 2012). From this it will be straightforward to
derive the matrix of partial derivatives of demand with respect to probabilities
given by eqn. (72) below.
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The solution to the optimization problem (3) is determined by F (x; ;p; I;) =
0 where
F (x; ;p; I;) =
(
DxU(x;)  p = 0
I   p  x = 0 ; (66)
and  is the Lagrange multiplier. The utility U is assumed to be di¤erentiably
strictly concave. It follows that D2xxU(x;) is negative denite which, as is well-
known (see Kreps 2012, Proposition 11.10), implies that Dx;F (x; ;p; I;) is
invertible and the implicit function theorem can be applied. We can dene0B@ K  
  T b
1CA =
0B@ D2xxU(x;)  p
 pT 0
1CA
 1
; (67)
where K is a symmetric S  S matrix and  is a S  1 vector. Dening
 = K (68)
and then applying the implicit function theorem yields
Dp;I;(x; ) =  (Dx;F ) 1Dp;I;F: (69)
Therefore we have
Dpx =   xT ; (70)
DIx =  ; (71)
Dx =  KD2xU(x;): (72)
It is well-known that the symmetric matrix  = (ij)SS has rank S   1 with
p = 0.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 When S > 2, demand is rationalized by a state independent Expected
Utility function of the form (1) if and only if the following conditions hold
@x1
@pj
 1
=
@xi
@pj
 i
8i; j 2 f2; 3; :::; Sg and i 6= j; (73)
@xj
@s
=  js ps
s
8j; s 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg (74)
and
xi = xj only if
pi=i
pj=j
= 1 8i; j 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg : (75)
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Before proving the theorem it is useful to note that (73) is equivalent to the
following condition on ij,
1j
 1
=
ij
 i
8i; j 2 f2; 3; :::; Sg and i 6= j (76)
and that (74) implies that demand is homogenous of degree zero in probabilities,
i.e., we have
SX
s=1
@xj
@s
s = 0: (77)
To prove the theorem rst note that Theorem 4 in Goldman and Uzawa (1964)
implies the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Demand is rationalizable by a separable utility function
U(x;) =
SX
s=1
us(xs;) (78)
if and only if eqn. (76) holds.
Since Goldman and Uzawa (1964) consider a more general setting, their con-
dition is actually more complicated. They require that for all i 6= j and all
k 6= l
ij
 i j
=
kl
 k l
: (79)
However, note that eqn. (79) is equivalent to (76) together with the following
1s
 s
=
1k
 k
: (80)
In our setting with only one good per state, this latter equation, (80), is redundant
since it follows from (76) by Slutsky symmetry. The fact that for all s; k, ks = sk
implies that 1s
s
= ks
k
= sk
k
= 1k
k
.
We are now in a position to prove the theorem.
Proof. To see the necessity of (73)-(75), note that under the assumption of state
independent Expected Utility, eqn. (72) simplies to
Dx =  Kdiag(u0(xs)) =  diag( ps
s
); (81)
where diag denotes the diagonal matrix. The second equality in (81) follows from
the denition of  and the fact that the agents rst order conditions imply that
for all s = 1; :::; S, u0(xs) = 
ps
s
. Therefore (81) implies (74) while (73) follows
from Lemma 2. Conditions (75) are obvious.
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To prove su¢ ciency, rst note that following Lemma 2 condition (76) implies
the existence of a utility function of the form
U(x;) =
SX
s=1
us(xs;): (82)
Conditions (74) uniquely determine the matrix Dx(p; I;). Since  has rank
S   1 and x = 0 only if x = p for some  all solutions to eqn. (74) must have
the form for each s; j 2 f1; :::; Sg,
@2us
@j@xs
= jps if j 6= s; @
2us
@j@xs
= sps + 
ps
s
if j = s; (83)
for some 1; :::; S, where  denotes, as above, the Lagrange multiplier. Noticing
that
@2

us
s

@s@xs
=
1
s
@2us
@s@xs
  1
2s
@us
@xs
(84)
and
@us
@xs
= ps; (85)
we can rewrite (83) as
@2

us
s

@j@xs
=
jps
s
8j; s 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg: (86)
Without loss of generality, assume that k 6= 0 (8k 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg).4 Then for all
i 6= j 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg, we have
@2(ui=i)
@xi@k
@2(uj=j)
@xj@k
=
jpi
ipj
8k 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg: (87)
But the rst order conditions for optimality imply that
pi
pj
=
@ui
@xi
@uj
@xj
,
@(ui=i)
@xi
@(uj=j)
@xj
=
jpi
ipj
(88)
and hence we obtain
@2(ui=i)
@xi@k
@2(uj=j)
@xj@k
=
@(ui=i)
@xi
@(uj=j)
@xj
: (89)
Denoting
hs (xs;) =
@ (us=s)
@xs
(s = i; j) ; (90)
4If k = 0 for some k, one can always multiply the utility function with some nonzero function
of k to make k 6= 0.
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we have
@ (lnhi (xi;))
@
=
@ (lnhj (xj;))
@
; (91)
where it follows from the additive separability of U that hs must be a function of
only one xs (s = i; j). Following the proof of Theorem 2,
hs (xs;) = Ks () vs (xs) (s = i; j) ; (92)
where Ks and vs are dened in (41). Finally, it follows from the rst order
condition that
Ki () vi (xi)
Kj () vj (xj)
=
jpi
ipj
: (93)
Condition (75) implies that for all x and i 6= j 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg,
Ki () vi (x)
Kj () vj (x)
= 1 (94)
and hence K1 () v1 (x) = Ks () vs (x) for all s. Without loss of generality,
taking
Ks () = K () and u (xs) =
Z
vs (xs) ds =
Z
v (xs) ds (8s = 1; 2; :::; S) ; (95)
it immediately follows that the given demands can be rationalized by a utility func-
tion that is ordinally equivalent to a state independent Expected Utility function
as dened in eqn. (1), which concludes the proof.
Remark 4 It should be noted that additive separability plays a crucial role in the
above proof. Without additive separability, it can be veried that for the utility
function in Example 2, we have
@x1
@1
=
22p1I
(1p2   (1 + 22) p1)2
; (96)
@x2
@1
=   22p
2
1I
p2 (1p2   (1 + 22) p1)2
; (97)
11 =   212I
(1p2   (1 + 22) p1)2
; (98)
21 =
212p1I
p2 (1p2   (1 + 22) p1)2
; (99)
implying that
@x1
@1
=  11 p1
1
and
@x2
@1
=  21 p1
1
: (100)
Similarly, we can verify that
@x1
@2
=  12 p2
2
and
@x2
@2
=  22 p2
2
: (101)
Therefore, (74) holds. However, the utility function in Example 2 is clearly not
an Expected Utility.
20
References
Afriat, Sydney N. 1967. "The Construction of a Utility Function from Expen-
diture Date." International Economic Review 8: 67-77.
Andreoni, James and Charles Sprenger. 2012. "Risk Preferences Are Not
Time Preferences." American Economic Review 102: 3357-3376.
Antonelli, Giovanni B. 1886. "On the Mathematical Theory of Political Econ-
omy." in Preferences, Utility, and Demand: A Minnesota Symposium. ed. by John.
S. Chipman, Leonid Hurwicz, Marcel K. Richter, Hugo F. Sonnenschein. New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanavich Ltd.
Chiappori, Pierre-André and Jean-Charles Rochet. 1987. "Revealed Pref-
erences and Di¤erentiable Demand." Econometrica 55: 687-691.
Choi, Syngjoo, Raymond Fisman, Douglas Gale and Shachar Kariv.
2007. "Consistency and Heterogeneity of Individual Behavior under Uncertainty."
American Economic Review 97: 1921-1938.
Dybvig, Philip H. 1983. "Recovering Additive Utility Functions." International
Economic Review 24: 379-396.
Echenique, Federico and Kota Saito. 2013. "Savage in the Market." Unpub-
lished Working Paper.
Green, Richard C. and Sanjay Srivastava. 1986. "Expected Utility Maxi-
mization and Demand Behavior." Journal of Economic Theory 38: 313323.
Goldman, Steven M. and Hirofumi Uzawa. 1964. "A Note on Separability
in Demand Analysis." Econometrica 32: 387-398.
Hurwicz, Leonid and Hirofumi Uzawa. 1971. "On the Integrability of De-
mand Functions." in Preferences, Utility, and Demand: A Minnesota Symposium.
ed. by John. S. Chipman, Leonid Hurwicz, Marcel K. Richter, Hugo F. Sonnen-
schein. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanavich Ltd.
Kreps, David M. 2012. Microeconomic Foundations I: Choice and Competitive
Markets. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kubler, Felix and Karl Schmedders. 2010. "Non-parametric Counterfactual
Analysis in Dynamic General Equilibrium." Economic Theory 25: 181-200.
21
Polisson, Matthew and John Quah. 2013. "Revealed Preference Tests under
Risk and Uncertainty." University of Leicester Working Paper No. 13/24.
Samuelson, Paul A. 1938. "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer Behavior."
Economica 5: 61-71.
  1947. Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Slutsky, Eugen 1915. "On the Theory of the Budget of the Consumer." in Read-
ings in Price Theory. ed. by American Economic Association, G. J. Stigler, 27-56.
Varian, Hal R. 1982. "The Nonparametric Approach to Demand Analysis."
Econometrica 50: 945-973.
 1983. "Nonparametric Tests of Models of Investor Behavior." Journal of Fi-
nancial and Quantitative Analysis 18: 269-278.
  1988. "Estimating Risk Aversion from Arrow-Debreu Portfolio Choice."
Econometrica 56: 973-979.
22
